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Non-technical summary
To meet its emissions reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans
to implement an emissions trading system within the European Community which
covers large installations of energy-intensive industries. An important element of the
Directive left open to Member States is the grandfathering mechanism of allowances
across industries (installations). Several metrics have been proposed for the alloca-
tion of allowances across production facilities, most notably output-based approaches
or emission-based approaches. However, dynamic grandfathering schemes which take
production or emission levels as a basis for allocation can lead to strategic behavior of
firms with adverse implications for overall economic efficiency. With respect to policy
guidance, a key challenge from an economic point of view is to identify allocation rules
that minimize efficiency losses.
In this paper, we study first- and second-best allocation rules for dynamic grandfather-
ing schemes with concretions to an open or a closed emissions trading system:
• For (small) open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous, first-best
second-period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions
in the initial period. Second-best schemes are based on a weighted combination of
first-period output and emission levels. They correspond to a Ramsey-type rule
of optimal tax differentiation: The more inelastic output (emissions), the larger
should be the weight to output (emissions). This highlights the importance of
firms’ (sectors’) characteristics when designing a grandfathering scheme.
• If the emissions trading system is closed, first- and second-best rules coincide. To
preserve efficiency, grandfathering must not depend on previous output levels.
Optimal grandfathering schemes consist of an assignment proportional to the
emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm-specific
decisions in either of the two periods. The proportionality factor must not differ
between firms (sectors).
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1 Introduction
To meet its emissions reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans
to implement a emissions trading system within the European Community (EU 2001)
which covers large installations of energy-intensive industries. It is envisaged to link
the trading scheme with other (non-EU-)schemes and project-based mechanisms like
Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto
Protocol (UNFCCC 1997). The proposed scheme consists of several temporal stages:
a first phase from 2005 until 2007, a second one from 2008 until 2012, coinciding
with the launch of the Kyoto Protocol, and subsequent five-year-periods covering Post-
Kyoto commitment periods. Member States will allocate emission allowances for free
(grandfathering) until 2008 and can auction 10 per cent of the allowances in the second
phase.
An important element of the Directive left open to Member States is the grandfathering
mechanism of allowances across industries (installations). Several metrics have been
proposed (Harrison and Radov 2002) for the allocation of allowances across production
facilities, most notably output-based approaches (e.g. kilowatt-hours of electricity
production) or emission-based approaches (e.g. tons of CO2 emissions). With respect
to policy guidance, a key challenge from an economic point of view is to identify
allocation rules that preserve overall economic efficiency.
Grandfathering schemes lead to efficiency losses if firms can increase their grandfa-
thered amount by choosing higher production or emission levels.1 As a consequence,
the literature has stressed the importance of static grandfathering schemes which are
only based upon historical information. Abstracting from income and terms-of-trade-
effects, the different metrics then simply have varying distributional impacts but leave
production plans of firms unaffected. Grandfathering boils down to non-distortionary
lump-sum transfers of allowances (Laan and Nentjes 2001; Woerdman 2001).
However, grandfathering schemes which take historical emissions as a basis for alloca-
tion within continuous planning cannot completely circumvent the problem of distor-
1For example, initial allocation can be based on past emissions or on standards from a previous
command-and-control system. Within the European emissions trading scheme, Germany discusses to
use (relative) emissions in 1990 as a basis for grandfathering, in order to not reward firms for “early
actions”.
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tions: Upcoming firms’ decisions will determine the emission levels that are “historical”
in subsequent periods. For example, grandfathering in 2013-2017 might be based upon
activities in 2008-2012. Dynamic grandfathering schemes that employ updated infor-
mation along the time-path in general lead to strategic behavior of firms and, hence,
also affect economic efficiency.
Dynamic incentives of grandfathering are studied by Laplante et al. (1997). They
show that for specific grandfathering schemes strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms
during the transition from a command-and-control regime to emissions trading does
not necessarily imply welfare losses. In their setting, the aggregate emissions level is
endogeneous.
The focus of our paper is different. We develop a simple two-period emissions trad-
ing framework to determine general design rules for optimal dynamic grandfathering
schemes where the allocation of allowances can be based on output or emission levels
of the previous period. Grandfathering, then, acts as a subsidy to production or emis-
sions. We therefore relate the discussion of optimal grandfathering schemes to rules of
optimal taxation. We find that the design of optimal grandfathering schemes crucially
depends on whether the emissions trading system is closed or open to a larger (the
world) market:
• For (small) open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous, first-best
second-period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions
in the initial period. Second-best schemes are based on a weighted combination
of first-period output and emission levels. They correspond to a Ramsey-type
rule of optimal tax differentiation: The more inelastic output (emissions), the
larger should be the weight to output (emissions) in the grandfathering rule.
In the extreme case, grandfathering is exclusively based on output (emissions).
This highlights the importance of firms’ (sectors’) characteristics when designing
a grandfathering scheme.
• If the emissions trading system is closed, first- and second-best rules coincide. To
preserve efficiency, grandfathering must not depend on previous output levels.
The optimal grandfathering scheme consists of an assignment proportional to
the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm-
specific decisions in either of the two periods. The proportionality factor must
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not differ between firms (sectors). Although acting like a subsidy to emissions,
this grandfathering scheme cannot lead to an increase of emissions in a closed
system, and therefore only affects the nominal allowance price.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We first describe our basic model
and show the correspondence between grandfathering and subsidies. We then derive
and discuss the conditions for first- and second-best grandfathering rules in the open
and the closed emissions trading system. Policy implications are discussed and illus-
trated for some specific cost structures. Finally, we conclude.
2 Analytical Framework
We set up a simple two-period partial equilibrium model.2 Firm (sector) i’s technology
in period t (t = 1, 2) is given by its cost function cit(qit, eit) where qit denotes the output
level and eit the emissions emerging from production. As usual, costs cit are assumed
to be twice differentiable and convex with citq = ∂c
it/∂qit > 0; cite = ∂c
it/∂eit ≤ 0;
citqq, c
it
ee,−citeq ≥ 0; and citqq · citee − (citeq)2 > 0. The firm sells output qit at a competitive
consumer price pt, and must hold allowances for emissions eit. Emission allowances can
be traded on a competitive allowance market at an allowance price σt. Initially, firm
i is assigned with e¯i1 grandfathered allowances in period 1. The assignment in period
2 might depend on firm’s decisions in period 1 and other non-firm-specific economic
parameters: e¯i2 = gi(ei1, qi1). Without loss of generality we assume that
e¯i2 = gi(ei1, qi1) = λi0 + λ
i
qq
i1 + λiee
i1
where the allocation rule is monotonic in qi1 and ei1, i.e. λiq,λ
i
e ≥ 0. The grandfathering
scheme is referred to as G = (λi0,λ
i
q,λ
i
e)i.
Firms anticipate the impact of their first-period decisions on the number of grand-
fathered permits they receive in period 2. Given an overall emission constraint over
the time horizon, the regulatory authority has to guarantee that aggregate emissions
assignments do not exceed a pre-specified level E¯t in period t, i.e.X
i
e¯i1 = E¯1 and
X
i
e¯i2 =
X
i
gi(ei1, qi1) = E¯2
2An extension of the two-period case to the multi-period case is straightforward.
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In the following, we distinguish the cases whether the emissions trading system is open
or closed to the world market.3 In the former case, we assume that the world market
price of emissions allowancs is exogenously given by σWMt (small open economy). In the
latter, emissions have to satisfy
P
i e
it = E¯t in both periods and the allowance price σt
is endogeneous.
2.1 Socially optimal allocation
Given the openess/closeness of the system and assuming w.l.o.g. that there is no
discounting, the optimal output and emission levels are obtained by maximizing
max
X
t
"X
i
£
ptq
it − cit(qit, eit)
¤
− σWMt
ÃX
i
eit − E¯t
!#
s.t.
P
i e
it = E¯t if the system is closed. This yields the following first-order conditions
(note: index j is used interchangeably with index i)
pt = c
it
q (1)
−cite = −cjte =: σ∗t (2)
where the market price of emissions, σ∗t , coincides with σ
WM
t for the open system. We
refer to this as the social optimum ((qit∗, eit∗)i,σ∗t )t.
As well-known, in the social optimum the consumer price equals marginal production
costs, and marginal abatement costs coincide for all firms.
2.2 The decentralized economy
Next, we consider the decentralized economy in which firms can trade their emissions
allowances and output on competitive markets. The competitive firm i maximizes its
3This reflects concrete policy concerns that the European emissions trading system might not be
linked with trading schemes from other signatory countries under the Kyoto Protocol or allow for using
credits obtained from Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.
Such a recognition of allowances and credits from other schemes (the world market) is now envisaged
as a further development of the Directive. Clearly, the openess of the system is a prerequisite for
achieving emission reduction at lowest costs. However, there can be serious reasons for closing the
system, such as concerns on environmental effectiveness due to loopholes in satellite systems.
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two-period stream of profits
max
X
t
[ptq
it − cit(qit, eit)]− σ1(ei1 − e¯i1)− σ2(ei2 − [λi0 + λiqqi1 + λieei1])
leading to first-order conditions
p1 + σ2λ
i
q = c
i1
q (3)
p2 = c
i2
q (4)
σ1 − σ2λie = −ci1e (5)
σ2 = −ci2e (6)
As in the case of the social planner problem, conditions (4) and (6) imply efficient
production and emission plans in period 2: Marginal production and abatement costs
equal the prices for the consumption good and emissions allowances, respectively. Com-
parison with (1) and (2) yields
σ2 = σ
∗
2
and, thus, second period allocation does not depend on the grandfathering scheme
G = (λi0,λ
i
q,λ
i
e)i.
In period 1, however, the grandfathering rule, G, drives a wedge between nominal prices
and marginal costs (conditions (3) and (5)). If λiq > 0, the consumer price in period 1,
p1, is smaller than the implicit producer price p1 + σ2λ
i
q. The allocation rule therefore
provides implicit production subsidies σ2λiq. Analogously, emission subsidies are given
by σ2λ
i
e. The nominal first period emission price, σ1, is given by σ
WM
1 , for the open
emission trading system while it depends on the grandfathering scheme for the closed
system.
In general, the first period equilibrium is given by (4) and (6) together with σ1 = σWM1
for the open, and
P
i e
i1 = E¯1 for the closed system. The solution is denoted by
((qi1(G), ei1(G))i, σ1(G)).
For given prices (pt, σt), differentiating (4) and (6), yields
∂qi1
∂λi0
= ∂e
i1
∂λi0
= 0, and ∂q
i1
∂λiq
=
σ2
ci1ee
∆ic
> 0, ∂e
i1
∂λie
= σ2
ci1qq
∆ic
> 0, ∂q
i1
∂λie
= ∂e
i1
∂λiq
= σ2
−ci1qe
∆ic
> 0, where ∆ic = c
i1
eec
i1
qq − (ci1qe)2 > 0.
Therefore, increases of λiq,λ
i
e lead to increases of emissions and output.
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2.3 The open emissions trading system
Optimal grandfathering schemes for the (small) open emissions trading system are
derived from
maxG
X
i
[p1q
i1(G)− ci1(qi1(G), ei1(G))− σWM1 ei1(G)] (7)
s.t.
X
i
[λi0 + λ
i
qq
i1 + λiee
i1] = E¯2 (8)
and λi0,λ
i
q,λ
i
e ≥ 0 (9)
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers by µE, µ
i
0, µ
i
q, µ
i
e, respectively, and differentiating
by λi0,λ
i
q,λ
i
e, we obtain the following first-order conditions (note that
∂qi1
∂λi0
= ∂e
i1
∂λi0
= 0):
0 = −(µE + µi0) (10)
[p1 − ci1q + µEλiq]
∂qi1
∂λiq
− [σWM1 + ci1e − µEλie]
∂ei1
∂λiq
= −(µEqi1 + µiq) (11)
[p1 − ci1q + µEλiq]
∂qi1
∂λie
− [σWM1 + ci1e − µEλie]
∂ei1
∂λie
= −(µEei1 + µie) (12)
Using (3) and (5), conditions (10) - (12) simplify to
0 = µE + µ
i
0 (13)
λiq
∂qi1
∂λiq
+ λie
∂qi1
∂λie
=
µEq
i1 + µiq
σ2 − µE
(14)
λiq
∂ei1
∂λiq
+ λie
∂ei1
∂λie
=
µEe
i1 + µie
σ2 − µE
(15)
If there are no restrictions to the choice of the allocation scheme G, i.e on λi0, the
optimal scheme implies µE = µ
i
0 = 0, and hence, λ
i
q = λ
i
e = 0. The levels of λ
i
0,
however, are not uniquely determined but satisfy
P
i λ
i
0 = E¯
2. Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 1 In a (small) open economy, first-best second-period grandfathering schemes
G do not depend on firm-specific decisions in period 1, i.e. gi = λi0.
The reason is that output and emissions choices will be distorted and efficiency losses
occur unless λiq = λ
i
e = 0. The first-best therefore coincides with grandfathering rules
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that are independent of first period emissions and output. Grandfathering to firm i is
a lump-sum transfer of wealth σ2λ
i
0.
For political reasons, however, it might not be possible to use second period allocation
schemes that are not linked to firms’ performance in period 1.4 At least, possibly not
all allowances can be allocated lump-sum, i.e.
P
i λ
i
0 < E¯
2. Solving (14) and (15) for
λiq and λ
i
e gives
λiq =
·
[µEq
i1 + µiq]
∂ei1
∂λie
− [µEei1 + µie]
∂qi1
∂λie
¸
∆ic
(σ2)2[σ2 − µE]
(16)
λie =
"
[µEe
i1 + µie]
∂qi1
∂λiq
− [µEqi1 + µiq]
∂ei1
∂λiq
#
∆ic
(σ2)2[σ2 − µE]
(17)
We can reformulate this system using (cross) price elasticities: ηiee = −∂e
i1
∂σi
/ e
i1
σi
, ηiqq =
∂qi1
∂pi
/q
i1
pi
, ηiqe = −∂q
i1
∂σi
/q
i1
σi
, ηieq =
∂ei1
∂pi
/ e
i1
pi
(note that ηiqep
iqi1 = ηieqσ
iei1) where σi =
σ1 − σ2λie, pi = p1 + σ2λiq. Denoting ∆iη = ηiqqηiee − ηiqeηieq = σ
ipi
ei1qi1
1
∆ic
, this leads to
τ iq :=
λiqσ2
pi
=
£
[µE + µ
i
q/q
i1]ηiee − [µE + µie/ei1]ηiqe
¤ 1
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(18)
τ ie :=
λieσ2
σi
=
£
[µE + µ
i
e/e
i1]ηiqq − [µE + µiq/qi1]ηieq
¤ 1
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(19)
which corresponds to a Ramsey-formula of optimal taxation (subsidies).
This formula can be substantially simplified. Note that µiq ≥ 0 and µE ≥ 0 since the
necessary distortions and, hence, efficiency losses increase with E¯2.5 Therefore, (18)
and (19) imply:
Proposition 2 In a (small) open economy, second-best grandfathering schemes G for
period 2, are determined by either of the following three Ramsey-rules for firm i:
(i) if ηiee ≥ ηiqe and ηiqq ≥ ηieq, then grandfathering is based on both output and emissions
according to:
τ iq =
µE
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(ηiee − ηiqe) τ ie =
µE
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(ηiqq − ηieq)
4For example, it is often postulated that grandfathering should account for the size and, therefore,
for future expansion and shrinkage of firms. As an extreme case, a firm should not perpetually receive
allowances although it already dropped out off the market.
5If E¯2 = 0, one can choose λiq = λie, which would yield first-best in period 1. The larger E¯2, the
larger λiq, λie have to be chosen which results in increased efficiency losses.
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(ii) if ηiqq < η
i
eq, then grandfathering is exclusively based on output:
τ iq =
µE
σ2 − µE
1
ηiqq
τ ie = 0
(iii) if ηiee < η
i
qe, only past emissions determine the number of grandfathered allowances:
τ ie =
µE
σ2 − µE
1
ηiee
τ iq = 0
The proof is given in the appendix.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that optimal grandfathering schemes (λiq,λ
i
e) can sub-
stantially differ across firms: It could be optimal to grandfather to one firm exclusively
based on emissions while another should be grandfathered based on a combination
of output and emissions. In general, a firm i with more elastic output (less elastic
emissions) gets a smaller fraction of grandfathered allowances related to output and a
smaller fraction connected to its emissions level. The differences between firms are the
larger, the larger µE
σ2−µE
is. Thus, differences between firm-specific grandfathering rules
increase in µE, i.e. in the aggregate number E¯
2 of allowances to be grandfathered in
period 2, and decrease in the second period emissions price σ2.
Grandfathering should be based on either output or emissions if the respective cross-
price elasticities exceed the price-elasticities. Here, the relative subsidies are inverse
to the price-elasticity of output (emissions). In this case it would even be efficiency-
increasing to negatively correlate grandfathering with the other factor, i.e. to choose
λie < 0 or λ
i
q < 0. Such an outcome, however, is ruled out by the (realistic) assumption
that grandfathering schemes must be monotonic in both emissions and output.
If, cross-price elasticities are small, optimal grandfathering is based on both emission
and output levels, i.e. λiq,λ
i
e > 0. Then,
τ iq
τ ie
=
λiqσ2/p
i
λieσ2/σ
i
=
ηiee − ηiqe
ηiqq − ηieq
which is the standard implication of the Ramsey rule for relative subsidies on output
and emissions in proportion to the respective producers prices: (i) The higher the elas-
ticity of emissions with respect to the emissions price, the smaller the relative subsidy
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on emissions, and (ii) the more elastic output reacts to a price increase, the smaller the
relative subsidy on output is. Interpreting cit(q, e) as the costs of an aggregate input to
produce (q, e), one can easily transform the formula into a Corlett-Hague type relation-
ship (Corlett and Hague 1953). The (intuitive) interpretation then is straightforward:
The better substitutable the aggregated input is to emissions, the larger the subsidies
on emissions compared to those on output.
We illustrate proposition 2 by the following simple examples for the two-firms-case:
Example 1
Assume that ηiqe = η
i
eq = 0. Then, as long as all price elasticities η
i
xx > 0 (x = q, e),
λix > 0 for all i, x, and optimal relative subsidies are given by the inverse elasticity rule:
τ ix =
µE
σ2−µE
1
ηixx
.¤
Example 2
Assume that ci1(q, e) = qα
i
e−β
i
(αi − βi > 1). This yields qi1(p, σ) = γiqpη
i
qqσ−η
i
qe and
ei1(p,σ) = γiep
ηieqσ−η
i
ee , where
ηiqq =
1 + βi
αi − βi − 1
, ηieq =
αi
αi − βi − 1
, ηiee =
αi − 1
αi − βi − 1
, ηiqe =
βi
αi − βi − 1
γiq =
(βi)η
i
qe
(αi)η
i
qq
, γie =
(βi)η
i
ee
(αi)η
i
eq
Therefore, in this case, ηiqq − ηieq < 0, and Proposition 2 implies that emissions must
not be subsidized, i.e. λie = 0, whereas the optimal grandfathering rule λ
i
q for firm i is
given by τ iq =
µE
σ2−µE
1
ηiqq
.¤
2.4 The closed emissions trading system
If the emissions trading scheme is closed, i.e.
P
i e
it = E¯t, first period equilibrium
again depends on the specific grandfathering rule and is given by (4) and (6). Instead
of solving the social welfare maximization problem explicitly, the social optimum, which
is given by (1) and (2), can be achieved without relying on lump-sum transfers. To see
this, note that if
λiq = 0, λ
i
e = λ
j
e =: λe
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the equilibrium conditions (4) and (6) simplify to
p1 = c
i1
q (20)
σ1 − σ∗2λe = −ci1e (21)
Given that
P
i e
i1 = E¯1, the comparison of (20) and (21) with the social optimum (1)
and (2) yields:
σ1 = σ
∗
1 + σ
∗
2λe (22)
i.e. the effective price of allowances, σ1 − σ∗2λe, is independent of λe. Thus, for any
given λe we can achieve first-best in period 1, ((qi1∗, ei1∗)i, p∗1,σ
∗
1). We determine λe
from the grandfathering condition
P
i[λ
i
0 + λee
i1∗] = E¯2:
λe =
E¯2 −
P
i λ
i
0
E¯1
To summarize, even if lump-sum transfer of allowances are not feasible, i.e. λi0 = 0,
social optimality is not jeopardized.
Proposition 3 In a closed emissions trading system, first-best second-period grandfa-
thering schemes G consist of an assignment proportional to emission in period 1 plus
a term which does not depend on firm-specific decisions, i.e.
gi = λi0 + λee
i1
Proposition 3 states that efficient grandfathering schemes must not depend on firms’
output levels but are linear in the first-period emission levels. Although the equilibrium
allocation and therefore efficiency is independent from the specification ofG = (λi0,λe)i,
different lump-sum transfers λi0 clearly have distributional impacts. From a practical
policy point of view, it is important to note that the flexibility to account for dis-
tributional (equity) concerns without efficiency trade-offs shrinks with the number of
permits that can be allocated in a lump-sum way (
P
i λ
i
0 < E¯
2). In the extreme case,
where λi0 = 0, there is only one grandfathering scheme that guarantees efficiency.
Corollary 4 If lump-sum transfers are ruled out (λi0 = 0) in a closed emissions trading
system, the sole grandfathering scheme that warrants efficiency assigns allowances pro-
portional to first-period emissions. The proportionality factor is given by the targeted
contraction factor of aggregate emissions, i.e. λe = E¯2/E¯1.
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2.5 Policy implications
A major policy claim in the debate on allocation schemes is that an installation (firm)
should not perpetually receive transfers via the grandfathering rule although it has
already been shut down. Otherwise unilateral abatement might provide strong in-
centives for multinational companies to relocate production activities to non-abating
regions while reaping allowance credits for closed installations in regions that form part
of the abatement regime. The allocation rule could meet such concerns by choosing
λi0 = 0, i.e. by using the discussed second-best allocations rules. Then, if a firm is
closed in period 1 (ei1 = qi1 = 0), it receives no emissions allowances in period 2 (as
well as in subsequent periods which are not modelled here). In the closed system,
economic efficiency, i.e. the decision to maintain or drop the installation, will not be
affected since the effective costs of holding emission allowances do not depend on the
choice of λe. In the open system, however, efficiency requires λ
i
e = λ
i
q = 0 unless there
are firms which produce or emit infinitely inelastic. Hence, there is a trade-off between
economic efficiency (λie = λ
i
q = 0) and addressing the concerns of perpetual transfers
(λi0 = 0).
Another key issue in the set-up of allocation schemes is the treatment of new market
entrants. If the latter are not grandfathered, there is a distributional bias towards
incumbent firm. The distributional bias becomes the more severe, the higher λie and
λiq. In other words, a dynamic grandfathering rule, exacerbates the distributional bias
in favor of incumbent firms. This problem can be dealt with by holding back free
allowances for new entrants. Note again that for the open system there is a potential
conflict between efficiency (λie = λ
i
q = 0) and political acceptance of the system by
firms which frequently argue that allocation should reflect output and emission levels .
3 Conclusions
From 2005, the EU will have the first international trading system for greenhouse
gas emission allowances. Until then, Member States must have developed national
allocation plans for emission allowances across large installations of energy-intensive
firms. Obviously, a core requirement to such allocation plans is that they preserve
the cost-saving potential of emission trading. In this paper, we have studied first- and
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second-best allocation rules for dynamic grandfathering schemes with concretions to an
open or a closed trading system. In the open system, first-best requires lump-sum allo-
cation while second-best rules correspond to a Ramsey-formula and are generally based
on a combination of output and emission levels. In the closed system, however, efficient
grandfathering requires independence of the allocation of previous output levels, i.e.
the initial allocation must be linear in past emission levels.
In real practice, implementation of even second-best rules across EU Member States
may not be possible due to various reasons. Allocation rules typically addressed in the
policy debate are either based on emissions or output. For concrete policy advice, it
may therefore be crucial to quantify the magnitude of efficiency losses associated with
alternative policy-relevant allocation schemes.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
We first rewrite (18) and (19) as:
τ iq =
λiqσ2
pi
=
£
[µE + µ
i
e/e
i1](ηiee − ηiqe) + [µiq/qi1 − µie/ei1]ηiee
¤ 1
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(23)
τ ie =
λieσ2
σi
=
£
[µE + µ
i
e/e
i1](ηiqq − ηieq)− [µiq/qi1 − µie/ei1]ηieq
¤ 1
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(24)
(i) Let us that τ iq = τ
i
e = 0. Then, (23) and (24) reduce toÃ
ηiee − ηiqe ηiee
ηiqq − ηieq ηieq
!Ã
µE + µ
i
e/e
i1
µiq/q
i1 − µie/ei1
!
=
Ã
0
0
!
The determinant of the matrix is −∆iη < 0, therefore the only solution of the system
were µE + µ
i
e/e
i1 = 0, µiq/q
i1 − µie/ei1 = 0 which implies µE = 0. That is, only if first-
best can be obtained, λie = λ
i
q = 0. Hence, for µE > 0, at firm i will be grandfathered
based on past emissions or output.
(ii) Assume that τ iq, τ
i
e > 0, and therefore µ
i
q/q
i1 = µie/e
i1 = 0. Then, (23) and (24)
lead to
τ iq =
µE
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(ηiee − ηiqe) τ ie =
µE
∆iη[σ2 − µE]
(ηiqq − ηieq)
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which requires ηiee > η
i
qe, and η
i
qq − ηieq > 0.
(iii) Assume that τ iq = 0, and therefore (from (i)) τ
i
e > 0 and µ
i
e/e
i1 = 0. Here, (23)
implies that µiq/q
i1 = −η
i
ee−ηiqe
ηiee
. Since µiq ≥ 0, this implies ηiee − ηiqe < 0, on the one
hand, and, with (24), τ ie =
µE
σ2−µE
1
ηiee
.
(iv) The remaining case, τ ie = 0, follows the same line of reasoning as (iii).¤
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